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ABSTRACT 
 
Background 
Australia has commenced public reporting and benchmarking of healthcare associated 
infections (HAIs), despite not having a standardised national HAI surveillance program. 
Annual hospital Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream (SAB) infection rates are released 
online, with other HAIs likely to be reported in the future. Although there are known 
differences between hospitals in Australian HAI surveillance programs, the effect of these 
differences on reported HAI rates is not known. 
Objective 
To measure the agreement in HAI identification, classification, and calculation of HAI rates, 
and investigate the influence of differences amongst those undertaking surveillance on these 
outcomes. 
Methods 
A cross-sectional online survey exploring HAI surveillance practices was administered to 
infection prevention nurses who undertake HAI surveillance. Seven clinical vignettes 
describing HAI scenarios were included to measure agreement in HAI identification, 
classification, and calculation of HAI rates. Data on characteristics of respondents was also 
collected. Three of the vignettes were related to surgical site infection and four to 
bloodstream infection. Agreement levels for each of the vignettes were calculated.  Using the 
Australian SAB definition, and the National Health and Safety Network definitions for other 
HAIs, we looked for an association between the proportion of correct answers and the 
respondents’ characteristics. 
Results 
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Ninety-two infection prevention nurses responded to the vignettes. One vignette 
demonstrated 100% agreement from responders, whilst agreement for the other vignettes 
varied from 53% to 75%. Working in a hospital with more than 400 beds, working in a team, 
and State or Territory was associated with a correct response for two of the vignettes. Those 
trained in surveillance were more commonly associated with a correct response, whilst those 
working part-time were less likely to respond correctly.  
Conclusion 
These findings reveal the need for further HAI surveillance support for those working part-
time and in smaller facilities. It also confirms the need to improve uniformity of HAI 
surveillance across Australian hospitals, and raises questions on the validity of the current 
comparing of national HAI SAB rates. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite the absence of a standardised national healthcare associated infection (HAI) 
surveillance program in Australia, public reporting of HAI rates has commenced. Annual 
hospital level HAI Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream (SAB) infection rates have been 
reported publicly since 2012–13.[1] Although national safety and quality health service 
standards mandate HAI surveillance,[2] there is a large variation in HAI surveillance 
processes across Australia’s eight State and Territories. [3, 4] Although a national definition 
for SAB does exist, [5] a major difference is the varying use of the National Health and 
Safety Network (NHSN) definitions [6] with or without local modifications to identify other 
HAIs. [4] It is unclear how much this variation influences the interpretation and application 
of definitions and subsequent HAI rates.  
 
Whilst benchmarking and public reporting of HAI is new to Australia, it has been common in 
several countries for some time, including the USA, England, and France.[7] Nevertheless, 
there remains significant concern regarding the use of HAI data as performance indicators, 
particularly in light of insufficient standardisation of events being monitored.[8, 9] 
 
If HAI rates are used as quality indicators, data must be robust and reliable.[10] A recent 
study by Keller et al identified low inter-rater reliability between those performing HAI 
surveillance and concluded that such discordance could “dramatically affect not only hospital 
reputations but also hospital reimbursement”.[11] Despite the lack of evidence demonstrating 
a reduction of HAI rates using financial incentives,[12, 13] one Australian State has recently 
implemented financial penalties for preventable HAI bloodstream infections.[14]  
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If Australia is to commence public reporting of other HAI data, it is important to be assured 
the data is robust and reliable. The objective of this study was to measure agreement in HAI 
identification, classification, and calculation of HAI rates amongst those undertaking HAI 
surveillance in Australian hospitals using a series of clinical vignettes. We also investigated if 
differences amongst those undertaking surveillance influenced their responses.  
 
Method 
 
Study Instrument 
A total of seven vignettes representing HAI surveillance situations that may occur in the 
acute care setting were developed as part of a larger cross-sectional survey which explored 
HAI surveillance practices in Australian hospitals. [4] The vignettes were based on those 
published in similar studies and in a local implementation guide,[15-17] and were further 
developed in collaboration with infection prevention experts from a jurisdictional 
surveillance program. As not all hospitals undertake surveillance on the same type of 
inception, the survey was designed so that participants only answered those vignettes on 
which they undertook surveillance. For example, if a respondent indicated they did not 
perform surveillance on central line associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), they were 
not presented with a vignette describing a potential CLABSI. 
 
The vignettes were categorised into either a surgical site infection (SSI) or bloodstream 
infection. These types of infection were included as they represent the most common types of 
HAI surveillance undertaken. The first was specific to those undertaking SSI surveillance on 
coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) to identify how they calculated an infection rate 
if more than one wound site was involved. A gastrointestinal surgery vignette was designed 
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to be a straightforward case and therefore considered a positive control. The other SSI 
vignette was slightly more challenging in that it sought clarification as to whether or not the 
SSI was an organ space or deep SSI.   
 
The SAB vignette asked respondents to indicate if they would classify it as healthcare 
associated. Three central line associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) vignettes sought to 
identify differences regarding local modifications of the NHSN definitions, and the 
application of either 48 hours or 2 calendar days as the marker of hospital acquisition. 
 
For each vignette, participants were instructed to answer applying their “usual definitions and 
methods”.   
 
The survey was constructed using a secure online tool and piloted by four current and two 
former infection prevention staff. The pilot participants provided feedback on clarity, 
simplicity, flow and logic of the survey. After further amendments, the survey was further 
piloted by two of the six involved in the initial pilot.  
 
Population and recruitment  
The survey was administered to infection prevention nurses who undertake HAI surveillance 
from both public (government funded) and private acute care facilities with more than 50 
beds. This size facility was targeted as they were considered more likely to undertake HAI 
surveillance on a routine basis. 
 
Recruitment was through an open invitation email distributed through the Australasian 
College of Infection Prevention and Control (ACIPC) list server. Coordinators of State and 
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Territory surveillance programs, where they existed, were contacted and requested to 
encourage those in their State and Territory to complete the survey. Members of the 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care HAI Advisory Committee were 
requested to overtly support completion of the survey to their peers and colleagues. The email 
requested all recipients to forward on to others who may not have received it. 
 
No identifying details of participants or their facilities were requested. Ethics permission was 
granted by the University Human Research Ethics Committee, Queensland University of 
Technology (1400000339).  
 
Statistical analysis 
Agreement for the SSI and CLABSI vignettes was calculated as the proportion of responses 
considered correct using NHSN definitions, [6] and for the SAB vignette according to the 
Australian SAB definition.[5] Data was analysed using Stata, version 13 (Stata Corp, College 
Station, Texas).  
 
Single variable predictors of correct answers 
For each vignette, univariate analysis using logistic regression was used to generate an odds 
ratio of answering correct depending on the participants’ characteristics. To examine all 
vignettes combined a Poisson regression was used to analyse the total number correct across 
all vignettes with an adjustment to the denominator as participants only answered those 
vignettes on which they undertook surveillance. The results are presented as risk ratios and 
95% confidence intervals, where a risk ratio above 1 means a greater ‘risk’ of a correct 
answer. To make these results comparable with the logistic regression model using individual 
vignettes, the odds ratios from the logistic regressions were converted to risk ratios.[18] 
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To explore the influence of the location (i.e. State or Territory of respondent), a Kruskall–
Wallis test was used for each individual vignette and the combined analysis of the total 
number correct.  
 
Multivariable predictors of correct answers 
In an attempt to identify independent predictors of answering correct, a multivariable Poisson 
model of the total number correct was developed from characteristics identified in the 
Poisson univariate analysis that had a p-value under 0.5. A high p-value threshold was used 
to ensure that all potentially important variables were considered. To check for 
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each variable was explored. Variables 
with a VIF of 5 or above indicating high collinearity were removed from final multivariable 
model.   
 
 
Results 
A total of 92 responses to the vignettes were received. All respondents were registered nurses 
with an average age of 49 and a mean of 12 years of experience working in infection 
prevention. There was representation from each of the eight States and Territories in 
Australia. The majority of respondents worked as part of a team (73%) and in public facilities 
(80%). Only 51% reported having been trained in HAI surveillance. The median number of 
vignettes answered was 5 out of a maximum of 7. (Table 1) 
 
A summary of each vignette, response options and response rates are listed in Table 2 The 
number of respondents varied from 23 for Vignette 1 to 85 for Vignette 5. This reflects the 
 10
usual type of infections participants performed surveillance on, and so those vignettes not 
answered were not missing values but correctly not answered. The control vignette was 
correctly answered by all respondents, however the correct response rates for the other 
vignettes varied from 53% to 75%. (Table 2) 
 
Predictors of correct answers 
Univariate analysis identified three factors that were statistically significantly associated with 
the outcome of two of the vignettes (Table 3). For Vignette 3, which challenged the 
responder with the difference between classifying a SSI as either an organ space infection or 
a deep infection, those who worked in a team were more than twice as likely to respond 
correctly (RR=2.16, [95%CI:1.14, 2.97]) The State or Territory of the respondents was also 
statistically significantly associated with a correct answer (p=0.045, Kruskall–Wallis test).  
 
Vignette 5 explored the difference between the current NHSN criteria for CLABSI against 
2008 criteria. Working in a hospital with over 400 beds more than doubled the likelihood of a 
correct answer (RR=2.42, [95%CI:1.09, 3.45]), but those who have had surveillance skills 
assessed were less likely to have a correct answer (RR=0.32, [95%CI;0.09, 0.98]). There was 
evidence that the proportion answering correctly varied between State or Territory (Kruskal–
Wallis test: p=0.043). 
 
Those characteristics that were more frequently associated with a correct response across all 
vignettes were: working in a hospital over 400 beds, having been formally trained in 
surveillance, being trained by a central organisation, working in a team, and having daily 
access to an epidemiologist. The characteristic most commonly associated with an incorrect 
response was working part-time.  
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No statistically significant factors were identified for the total number correct, but 
characteristics most strongly associated with a correct response were working in a team 
RR=1.15 (95% CI: 0.89, 1.49) and daily access to an epidemiologist RR=1.15 (95%CI: 0.81, 
1.62). Working part-time was most strongly associated with an incorrect answer RR=0.89 
(95%CI: 0.69, 1.14).  
 
Multivariable analysis 
Two multivariable models were developed. (Table 4) Characteristics from the univariate 
analysis that had a p-value < 0.5 were included in the first model (Model A). The variable 
“Work in a Team” was found to have a VIF of 5. Therefore, a second multivariate model 
(Model B) was generated following the omission of  “Work in a Team”. 
 
For both models, the probability of getting a correct answer increased by 12% if the 
respondent had daily access to an epidemiologist, and 8% if they had an academic degree or 
higher. For Model A the probability increased by 11% if they worked as part of a team. Both 
models also identified that incorrect answers were more common for respondents who were 
part-time or with less than five years experience. No statistically significant factors were 
identified. 
 
Discussion  
This study has identified disparity in HAI identification, classification, and calculation of 
HAI rates using clinical vignettes in large acute care Australian hospitals. Although one 
vignette returned an encouraging result of 100% correct response rate, it was included as a 
positive control. The range of responses of 53% to 75% for the other six vignettes follows on 
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from recent findings describing the broad variation amongst surveillance practices in 
Australia, [4] and infer that comparison between hospitals, States and Territories, and any 
aggregation of existing data will be flawed. This is implicit from the following findings.  
 
First, aggregation of SSI rates following CABGs will result in an underestimation of the true 
rate whilst some hospitals, States and Territories persist in using each incision as the 
denominator to calculate a rate. Second, the inability to distinguish between organ space and 
deep space means that any aggregated SSI data reported by type of infection will likely be 
unreliable and incomparable. Third, the present use of both 48 hours or 2 calendar days as 
criteria for CLABSI acquisition clearly affects the CLABSI rate reported. Fourth, even 
though a national definition for SAB exists (unlike the potential HAIs described in other 
vignettes) when presented with a complex SAB event the ability to correctly identify it is 
moderate. This is important as current SAB rates, that are publicly reported on a safety and 
quality website in Australia encouraging hospital comparisons,[1] could be misleading. 
 
The univariate analysis findings suggest that those from larger hospitals and in States with 
established programs are more likely to be in agreement with current NHSN HAI definitions. 
This could be explained by the team environment of larger hospitals which may provide 
improved knowledge from greater learning opportunities, and the training provided by the 
established programs. 
 
Although no statistically significant predictors were identified in the multivariable analysis, 
the results from both models indicate that those with less experience and those who work 
part-time require increased support and training to identify HAIs.  
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Daily access to an epidemiologist was positively associated with a correct answer for all 
vignettes and also both models of the multivariable analysis. Given that only 1% of 
respondents have daily access to an epidemiologist, this may be a proxy for other factors 
(e.g., a thriving research culture) that have not been identified in this study and is worthy of 
further exploration. 
 
The results of this study are consistent with recent international studies that have identified 
broad variation in the identification of both SSI and CLABSI within and between HCW 
groups. [19, 15, 20-22, 16] Similar to Keller’s study,[15] we attempted to identify 
characteristics that may act as independent predictors of a correct response. Keller identified 
that those with a clinical background were more likely to identify a HAI correctly. All the 
respondents to this study were infection prevention nurses with a clinical background and like 
Keller, no other significant predictors were identified in a multivariable model. 
 
Unlike a recent study using clinical vignettes, [23] we were unable to estimate sensitivity and 
specificity for this study. Although most hospitals use HAI definitions based on NHSN, there 
is no uniform national definition for surgical site infection or CLABSI in Australia, and so 
there is no gold standard available to measure sensitivity and specificity. Also, the emphasis 
and main objective of this study was to measure agreement, rather than sensitivity and 
specificity amongst participants. 
 
There are limitations to this study. Selection bias and small numbers may influence the 
results. Despite the small number of responses, variation in agreement is clearly evident. A 
survey response rate was unable to be calculated as the number of infection prevention staff 
in Australia is unknown,[24] and we are uncertain how many received the survey. 
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Approximately 500 ACIPC members subscribe to the list server, (personal communication, 
ACIPC secretary June 2014), but not all undertake HAI surveillance, nor are all infection 
prevention staff members of ACIPC. It is estimated there are approximately 215 acute public 
hospitals with more than 50 beds in Australia,[25] and our respondents were from all States 
and Territories with a broad range of experience working in different sized hospitals, and so 
we are confident this is representative of those undertaking HAI surveillance. Not all 
participants answered each vignette, as they were only required to answer vignettes relevant 
to the type of surveillance they usually perform, therefore some vignettes were correctly not 
answered. Completing vignettes online does not represent reality, and many infection 
prevention staff will discuss potential HAIs before making a decision, particularly those who 
work in teams.  
 
A major strength of this study is its anonymity in that there was no pressure influencing the 
respondents if they had any uncertainty. This in fact may represent a more accurate reflection 
of infection prevention staff true understanding. 
 
Conclusion 
The results of this study have been derived from those who are currently charged with 
collecting HAI data, and indicate that training and support resources for those in smaller 
facilities who work part-time needs to be strengthened.  
 
Before national reporting can be established, robust standardised surveillance processes need 
to be implemented. Presently, the validity of existing SAB data is questionable, and the 
temptation to aggregate any existing HAI rates to generate national data must be avoided.  
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Table 1 – Number of vignettes answered by respondents 
Number of 
vignettes 
completed 
Percentage of 104* 
participants 
completing 
0 12% 
1 6% 
2 4% 
3 21% 
4 8% 
5 2% 
6 31% 
7 (maximum) 17% 
 
* 104 responses represent all those who completed the online survey, 12 did not complete 
any vignettes. 
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Table 2 – Summary of Vignettes and responses (responses in bold indicate correct 
response) 
Vignette Summary (n=responses) Response options Response rate 
(95% CI) 
1) CABGS patient with 2 SSI and 3 
incisions (n=23) 
1 SSI from 1 
procedure  
2 SSI from 1 
procedure 
2 SSI from 3 
procedures 
17% (5%-39%) 
 
74% (52%-90%) 
 
9% (1%-28%) 
2) Straightforward SSI following hip 
replacement (n=81) 
Yes SSI 
 
No SSI 
100% (96%-
100%)* 
0% 
3) SSI following bowel resection with 
collection requiring surgical drainage 
(n=81) 
Organ space SSI 
 
Deep SSI  
72% (60%-81%) 
 
28% (19%-40%) 
4) Presentation with infected leg ulcer 
with subsequent SAB during admission 
(n=84) 
Yes HAI SAB 
 
No HAI SAB 
53% (42%-64%) 
 
47% (36%-58%) 
5) CLABSI if applying pre 2008 NHSN 
criteria 2b (n=57) 
Yes CLABSI 
 
No CLABSI 
25%(14%-38%) 
 
75% (62%-86%) 
6) ICU attributable CLABSI (n=56) Yes CLABSI 
 
No CLABSI 
63% (49%-75%) 
 
38% (25%-51%) 
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7) CLABSI if using 2 calendar days but 
not 48 hours (n=55) 
Yes CLABSI 
 
No CLABSI 
60% (46%-73%) 
 
40% (27%-54%) 
95%CI = 95% Confidence Intervals 
*exact 95% confidence interval 
CABGS – Coronary artery bypass surgery 
SSI - Surgical site infection 
HAI – Healthcare associated infection 
SAB – Staphylococcus aureus bloostream bacteraemia 
CLABSI – Central line associated bloodstream infection 
 
Table 3 – Univariate logistic regression analysis of vignette and respondent characterstics, with the Kruskall–Wallis test of influence of State or 
Territory. 
Variable 
(proportion of 
respondents) 
n=92 
Vignette 1 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Vignette 3 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Vignette 4 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Vignette 5 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Vignette 6 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Vignette 7 
RR 
(95%CI) 
Hospital over 200 beds 
(64%) 
n/a 1.15  
 (0.47, 2.10) 
1.00  
 (0.58, 1.36) 
0.94  
 (0.30, 2.15) 
0.56  
 (0.14, 1.41) 
1.13  
 (0.44, 1.90) 
Hospital over 400 beds 
(38%) 
0.95  
  (0.11, 3.07) 
1.50  
 (0.71, 2.42) 
1.10  
 (0.72, 1.41) 
2.42 ^ 
 (1.09, 3.45) 
1.02  
 (0.46, 1.74) 
1.07  
 (0.51, 1.72) 
Academic degree or 
higher (72%) 
0.95  
 (0.01, 3.24) 
1.41  
 (0.58, 2.41) 
1.33  
 (0.91, 1.59) 
1.02  
 (0.33, 2.27) 
0.56  
 (0.14, 1.41) 
1.36  
 (0.59, 2.05) 
Public hospital 
(79%) 
1.40  
 (0.14, 3.30) 
0.97  
 (0.29, 2.04) 
0.76  
 (0.32, 1.25) 
1.27  
 (0.37, 2.72) 
1.74  
 (0.71, 2.46) 
1.31  
 (0.44, 2.12) 
Less than 5 years 
infection control 
experience (23%) 
1.07  
 (0.92, 3.15) 
0.50  
 (0.16, 1.35) 
0.66  
 (0.27, 1.13) 
1.02  
 (0.19, 2.53) 
0.63  
 (0.18, 1.56) 
1.86  
 (0.85, 2.42) 
Formal surveillance 1.76  1.23  0.70  1.02  1.25  1.22  
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training (48%)  (0.29, 3.44)  (0.54, 2.20)  (0.35, 1.11)  (0.19, 2.53)  (0.54, 2.02)  (0.56, 1.91) 
Trained by central 
organisation (21%) 
1.07 
(0.20, 2.82) 
1.53 
(0.58, 2.66) 
1.02 
(0.52, 1.44) 
2.27 
(0.53, 3.68) 
1.04 
(0.37, 1.92) 
1.00 
(0.35, 1.82) 
Surveillance skills 
assessed (17%) 
n/a 0.99  
 (0.32, 2.34) 
0.72  
 (0.27, 1.25) 
0.32 * 
 (0.09, 0.98) 
1.94  
 (0.85, 2.60) 
1.05  
 (0.37, 1.92) 
Work in a team (73%) 2.04  
 (0.04, 3.81) 
2.16 # 
 (1.14, 2.97) 
1.02  
 (0.58, 1.40) 
1.02  
 (0.33, 2.27) 
0.85  
 (0.26, 1.75) 
1.69  
 (0.86, 2.24) 
Daily access to Infectious 
Diseases Physician 
(59%) 
1.73  
 (0.18, 3.49) 
0.89  
 (0.35, 1.77) 
1.05  
 (0.64, 1.39) 
0.53  
 (0.14, 1.55) 
0.58  
 (0.16, 1.38) 
1.17  
 (0.48, 1.90) 
Daily access to 
Epidemiologist (1%) 
1.35  
 (0.14, 3.73) 
1.14  
 (0.25, 2.99) 
1.39  
 (0.68, 1.71) 
1.45  
 (0.23, 3.37) 
1.63  
 (0.32, 2.67) 
1.20  
 (0.27, 2.29) 
Daily access to 
Microbiologist (64%) 
1.73  
 (0.18, 3.49) 
0.90  
 (0.34, 1.81) 
0.82  
 (0.44, 1.23) 
1.39  
 (0.51, 2.65) 
1.00  
 (0.35, 1.87) 
0.91  
 (0.31, 1.72) 
Effective full time staff 
>3 (27%) 
0.49  
 (0.05, 2.34) 
0.84  
 (0.23, 2.11) 
0.69  
 (0.29, 1.19) 
0.76  
  (0.24, 1.82) 
0.95  
 (0.30, 1.90) 
0.39  
 (0.08, 1.19) 
Rarely or never have 
access to an ICP with 
0.49  
 (0.08, 1.91) 
1.51  
 (0.69, 2.49) 
1.07  
 (0.66, 1.41) 
0.66  
 (0.23, 1.60) 
0.93  
 (0.36, 1.74) 
1.04  
 (0.43, 1.78) 
 27
more experience (43%) 
Work part time (34%) 0.26  
 (0.04, 1.40) 
0.57  
 (0.21, 1.34) 
0.83  
 (0.44, 1.25) 
0.72  
 (0.21, 1.86) 
0.63  
 (0.18, 1.56) 
1.05  
 (2.46, 1.92) 
Kruskall–Wallis test for 
State/Territory  (P-value) 
0.0875 0.0454 0.4163 0.0427 0.2826 0.3389 
# p=0.011 ^ p=0.033 * p= 0.049  
RR = Risk Ratio 
95%CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
 
 
  
 28
 
Table 4 – Multivariable analysis of respondent characterstics using Poisson regression of the number of correct answers.  
 
 Model A - includes “Work in a team” Model B - excludes “Work in a team” 
Variable Risk ratio (95% CI) P value Risk ratio (95% CI) P value 
Hospital over 400 beds 0.99 (0.76, 1.31) 0.963 1.04 (0.81, 1.32) 0.766 
Academic degree or higher 1.08 (0.83, 1.39) 0.583 1.08 (0.84, 1.40) 0.545 
Less than 5 years infection control 
experience 
0.96 (0.71, 1.31) 0.808 0.96 (0.71, 1.30) 0.806 
Daily access to Epidemiologist 1.12 (0.78, 1.61) 0.548 1.12 (0.77, 1.61) 0.555 
Work part time 0.92 (0.69, 1.22) 0.555 0.91 (0.69, 1.20) 0.503 
Work in a team 1.11 (0.82, 1.50) 0.509 - - 
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95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
A risk ratio above 1 indicates an increased chance of a correct answer. 
